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Renewing the Chase: The First Amendment, Campaign
Advertisements, and the Goal of an Informed Citizenry
JOHN STEWART FLEMING*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long held that political speech is the most protected
form of speech under the First Amendment.1 The motivation behind this highly
protected status is clear: to facilitate a functioning democracy, restrictive
government censorship must not hinder free speech.2 Free expression includes the
promotion of competing ideas and, therefore, enhances the democratic electoral
process.3 Also key to a functioning democracy is freedom of the press. Rooted in
the reaction to the British Crown’s suppression of newspapers and pamphleteers
through “prior restraint,”4 in addition to the role of the printed press in this nation’s
founding,5 the Constitution’s drafters were keenly aware of the educational power
of communications media. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly reflects such a
history: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”6
Nevertheless, in terms of ensuring the diffusion of ideas, particularly through the
media, the government has a long and unfettered history of content-based
regulation.7 While the Court has recognized the government’s ability to regulate

* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. Indiana
University—Bloomington. I am terribly indebted to a good number of people, but I would
especially like to thank Michael McGregor, David Fleming, and Heather Shreve for their
very thoughtful comments and suggestions.
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (noting that the First Amendment
grants the greatest protection to political expression “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”).
2. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1998).
3. The Supreme Court sees the discourse between candidates preceding the election to
be as critical as the election itself. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)
(“[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”). Indeed, as noted in
Buckley v. Valeo, “[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry
to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those
who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.” 424 U.S. 1, 14–
15 (1976).
4. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712–23 (1931) (declaring invalid prior
restraints on speech and offering a summary on the history of prior restraints in
Anglo-American law).
5. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, 6
(1983) (describing “an outpouring of political writings—pamphlets, letters, articles,
sermons” in support of the principles of democracy).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (allowing the regulation of
content-specific speech under the guise of incitement); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (overruling Abrams, but affirming the ability to regulate content-specific speech in
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bad content in the media—such as indecency or obscenity8—over the past century,
the Court has also validated a content-diversity requirement. In particular, the Court
acknowledged the government’s need to foster political discourse as equally
important to regulating bad content. Throughout this country’s history, the primary
burden of informing the voting public has fallen to the press.9 As the media
evolves, so too does the Court’s recognition of the purpose and the extent of
government regulation.
As evidenced by the text of the First Amendment, the principal mode of
gathering important news first fell to the printed press. This remained true until the
advent of broadcast communications in the early twentieth century. Voters learned
the important facts of the day by listening to the radio, then by watching broadcast
television. Over the past few decades, however, the public has received information
from an increasingly diverse array of media: first cable, then satellite, and now the
Internet.10
The public’s reliance on cable news networks as a source of election coverage
has increased exponentially.11 A 2010 Pew Research Center survey found that
nearly 58% of Americans who received news did so via television news programs;
the percentage of Americans seeking news through newspapers fell to a record low
of 31%.12 Among those gathering their information on television, “cable news
cases of incitement).
8. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (permitting government
regulation of indecency); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (permitting the
banning of obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 476 (1957) (same).
9. The opinion in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff’d, 453 U.S. 367
(1981), provides a succinct, yet rather comprehensive history of the changing sources of
election coverage:
In the early days of this nation, political campaigns . . . were relatively simple
affairs. Campaigning took the form of speeches “from stump and pulpit, of
debate in the highly partisan press, of private correspondence, and of persuasive
activities on election day.” Near the close of the nineteenth century, however,
as printing presses became more common and the price of paper decreased, the
“era of campaign literature” began. Radio was first used in the 1924
campaign . . . . By 1928, it was the most important campaign medium.
Television was a factor in the 1948 election . . . . [and by] the 1952 campaign,
presidential candidates were spending millions of dollars on television. Today,
there can be no doubt that we are in the “era of television campaigning.”
Indeed, since 95 percent of our people operate a television set for an average of
over five hours a day, and 60 percent of them rely primarily on televisions for
news, it would be hard to overestimate the importance of television to our
political processes. It is undisputed that “[f]or presidential and senatorial
candidates, the television is a necessity.”
Id. at 9–10 (footnotes omitted).
10. See for instance, Stephen J. Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet
Non-Regulation Undermines the Rationales Used to Support Broadcast Regulation, 8 MEDIA
L. & POL’Y 1, 2–13 (1999), for an excellent overview of the emergence of various
communications technologies, and government’s Sisyphean attempts to regulate it.
11. Although called cable news channels, such channels are usually carried over both
cable systems and via satellite transmission.
12. PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS SPENDING MORE TIME FOLLOWING THE NEWS:
IDEOLOGICAL NEWS SOURCES: WHO WATCHES AND WHY? (Sept. 12, 2010), http://people-
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continues to play a significant role.”13 Nearly 40% of Americans receive their news
from cable television.14
What is most striking, however, is that viewing habits are increasingly polarized
by viewpoint. Such trends are occurring mostly along party lines. Among
Republicans, nearly four-in-ten regularly receive their news from the right-leaning
Fox News Network.15 This figure is up from roughly two-in-ten in 2000.16
Democrats are not only watching less Fox News (15%) than a decade ago (18%),
but over the past four years they have increasingly gathered their news primarily
from the left-leaning MSNBC (up 3–5%).17 Interest in the centrist CNN has fallen
among many segments of the political spectrum: Republicans are tuning in at lower
numbers than at any point in the past decade (down to 12% from 21% in 2000);18
Independents are seeking news elsewhere (down 2%);19 Democrats, however, have
maintained consistency (remaining between 24–25%).20 Overall viewership in
CNN has fallen 3% in the past decade; viewership in Fox News, meanwhile, has
risen by 6%.21 Tellingly, during the highly charged 2008 elections, the percentage
of people mainly receiving their news from cable sources reached a record high; the
number of those receiving such information from the two political sides of the
debate on cable increased significantly.22 Critically, this gravitation toward cable
news occurred despite overwhelming agreement that election coverage on cable
news channels was inherently biased (82%).23
These figures reveal a troubling trend: more people receive news and generate
their opinions primarily from narrowly tailored, partisan sources. In addition, many
complain that these channels cover aspects of elections that ultimately serve little
informative purpose—for instance, covering the daily goings-on of a campaign as
opposed to substantive policy differences between candidates.24 Programs on these
press.org/report/652/ [hereinafter AMERICANS SPENDING MORE TIME FOLLOWING THE NEWS].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ratings for the Fox News Network rose 6% while those for MSNBC increased by
4%, respectively, from 2000. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Jeffrey A. Benjamin, Note, Pushing Democracy: Content-Based Regulations of
the Press in Campaign Finance Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 599, 604 (2007) (describing
the dismal state of election coverage). Describing the current state of American political
discourse, Ian Crouch of the New Yorker used the choice term, “sordid ephemera.” Ian
Crouch, Literary Smackdown: Obama, Fox News, and Sitting Bull, NEW YORKER (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/books/literary-smackd. Crouch’s description
reflects the belief, held by many, that much of the Washington debate little informs the
voting public. A recent Pew Research Center survey found that a mere 35% of those voting
in the 2010 midterm elections believed that important issues were covered by politicians and
the media sufficiently, as compared to previous elections. PEW RES. CTR., MIXED REACTIONS
TO REPUBLICAN MIDTERM WIN: PUBLIC LESS HAPPY THAN AFTER 2006 AND 1994 ELECTIONS,
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channels, although purporting to carry discussions that are “fair and balanced,”25
tend to favor one perspective to the exclusion of others. This is done by allowing or
denying airtime to certain political candidates;26 it also takes the form of denying
ideologically opposing political groups the ability to air concerns.27 In addition, the
nature of television allows for the voluntary exclusion of diverse viewpoints: by
receiving only one channel at any particular time, viewers are able to tailor their
viewing habits to their own viewpoints. A viewer must merely turn on her
television, already preset to a channel of her choosing, to bypass the myriad other
“voices” on cable or satellite. Consequently, the entire “marketplace of ideas”28
may never enter the homes of a large portion of the voting public. A primary
concern of democratic government is the proper fostering of political speech,29
however, this development, added to a greater reliance on such channels as a
primary source of information, ultimately subverts the aggregate efficacy of the
democratic process. A poorly informed voting body, therefore, undermines the very
principle of democratic government.

(Nov. 11, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/675/ [hereinafter MIXED REACTIONS TO
REPUBLICAN MIDTERM WIN].
25. Referring to the rather tongue-in-cheek slogan for the Fox News Network—likely
created in response to the perceived bias of other news outlets. Nevertheless, both Fox News
and MSNBC have had their share of bias allegations levied against them. See, e.g.,
Candidates Running Against, and With, Cable News, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A24
(describing prominent Fox News personalities, such as Rupert Murdoch, Bill O’Reilly,
Glenn Beck, and Sean Hannity, as supporting Republicans in the midterm elections); Brian
Stelter & Bill Carter, Political Gifts by Olbermann Bring Suspension by MSNBC, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at A1.
26. See Fox Donates at Least $40 Million in Airtime to Potential GOP Presidential
Candidates, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 18, 2010, 5:50 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/research/201011180031 (describing the Fox News Network’s
decision to provide airtime exclusively to Republican Presidential Candidates).
27. See Frank James, MSNBC Rejects MoveOn.org’s Anti-Target Ad, NPR.ORG (Aug.
19, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/08/19/129307994/msnbcrejects-moveon-org-s-anti-target-ad; Richard Allen Smith, Why Fox News Rejected Our
POST
(May
5,
2010,
1:59
PM),
Clean
Energy
Ad,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-allen-smith/why-fox-news-rejectedour_b_564527.html (detailing Fox News’s refusal to air an ad generated from a liberal
veterans group); Amanda Terkel, Fox News Rejects Media Matters Ad Highlighting Its $1
Million GOP Donation, Admits News Corp Opposes “Democratic Candidates,”
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/08/25/media-matters-fox-ad-reject-republican_n_693887.html.
28. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]hat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . .”).
29. The Supreme Court in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969),
found this and substantially more. It ruled that not only does the FCC have a duty to
maintain the quality of content on licensed broadcasting for the public’s best interest, but so
too does its duty extend to guaranteeing that quality. “It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the
FCC.” Id. The justification for this conclusion was the “scarcity” of the broadcast spectrum.
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In light of this situation, and especially in response to the diminution of the
diversity of viewpoints in the substantive political debate on cable television
networks, this Note urges the federal government to implement a set of viewpoint
diversity rules for such programmers. The rules perhaps best suited for this are
some of the long-established principles of broadcast regulation: specifically the
equal opportunity30 and reasonable access31 provisions, along with the Zapple
doctrine.32 To effect the change necessary to accurately present candidates’ policy
views, these rules must conform to the modern cable landscape. The justifications
for this are many: not only have the traditional broadcast news stations lost
substantial viewership to cable news networks, but independent supporters’ group
and political action committee advertisements may well increase on these networks
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission.33 As the dependence on these sources for critical election coverage
increases, the breadth of regulation by Congress and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) must increase as well. To ensure that as many perspectives—
and indeed, policy stances articulated by the candidates themselves—reach the
voters as is possible, and as the primarily market-based approach has proven
ineffective, government must fill the void. With such a great reliance on cable news
channels as a primary source of information on critical election issues, a properly
functioning democracy demands a diversification of ideas from such sources.
Accordingly, this Note argues that at no previous time has the voting public been so
dependent on so few, pervasive sources. Moreover, as these sources do a wholly
inadequate job of fostering the requisite political debate to maintain a healthy
democratic system, the broadcast regulation ought to extend to cable television
networks.
To illustrate the importance of regulating political speech on cable, this Note is
divided into three main sections. Part I discusses the current constitutional
framework of modern media regulation. This framework spans from print, as the
least regulated form of communication, to broadcast television and radio, which
stand at the FCC’s regulatory apogee. The limits of cable regulation are also
explored. Part II centers on the rules, some created by Congress and others by the

30. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
31. Id. § 312(a)(7).
32. Letter from FCC to Nicholas Zapple, Commc’n Counsel, Comm. on Com., for
Interpretive Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
33. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that corporations are not limited in the amount they
may donate to political action committees (PACs)). Indeed, the effect of the ruling is that
corporations are now permitted to contribute unlimited amounts to PACs, which, in turn, pay
for and support candidates and interest groups. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, What Will Citizens
United Do to the 2010 Election Cycle?, WSJ L. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010 2:59 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/21/what-will-citizens-united-do-to-the-2010-electioncycle/. During the 2010 election cycle, the Republican Party benefitted the most from the
expansion of the election financing laws. According to one reporter, “Republican-leaning
outside groups spent $187 million this cycle compared to just $90 million by Democratic
groups, a two-to-one GOP advantage.” Jeanne Cummings, Republican Groups Coordinated
(Nov.
3,
2010
12:54
PM),
Financial
Firepower,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44651_Page2.html. This spending included
pointed attacks on the airwaves, including on the cable networks.
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FCC, regulating candidate and supporters’ political advertising speech. While the
theoretical underpinnings of the fairness doctrine serve as the bases for these rules,
the three rules discussed at length—equal opportunity, reasonable access, and the
Zapple doctrine, which I collectively call the “political advertising rules”—shall be
shown to still be in effect, and share none of the fairness doctrine’s drawbacks. Part
III discusses how and why the political advertising rules should apply to cable. The
policy justifications tethering the rules to broadcast regulation apply cleanly and
equally to cable regulation. This is all done within the settled constitutional
framework for cable regulation.
Indeed, the First Amendment’s protections of free speech and freedom of the
press were designed to ensure, among other objectives, an informed and educated
electorate.34 The last twenty years have seen an explosion of news sources that one
would expect to serve these interests. Consumers of news have numerous sources
available, from 24/7 cable news networks to thousands of news blogs and other
Internet websites. Paradoxically, however, the dramatic increase in available
sources does not necessarily serve the goal of an informed and educated electorate.
Many of the new sources promote a partisan political viewpoint, and news
consumers select those sources that match their political viewpoints. 35 The effect is
that consumers receive an increasingly narrow selection of political messages,
leading to a more polarized national debate. Gone are the days when major news
outlets attempted to present what they believed to be a balanced and neutral
selection of sources. While the media landscape today may more closely resemble
the highly polarized pamphleteering that was prevalent at the time of the founding,
the current landscape does not promote greater education of the electorate on
candidates’ views. So what is the solution? Increased regulation to require at least
the major cable networks to inform viewers about the candidates’ platforms. The
best means to accomplish this is by imposing the political advertising rules—equal
opportunity, reasonable access, and the Zapple doctrine—to cable. By doing so, a
better-informed electorate—at a minimum as to candidates’ official stances—
should be achieved.36

34. See, e.g., LETTERS OF CENTINEL, NO. 1 (Samuel Bryan), in THE ESSENTIAL
FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 73 (David Wootton ed., 2003) (categorizing
freedom of the press as the “palladium of freedom,” suggesting the liberating effects of the
spread of information).
35. See AMERICANS SPENDING MORE TIME FOLLOWING THE NEWS, supra note 12.
36. To be sure, this Note shall not seek to reimpose on cable and satellite many of the
content-based demands required by the now-defunct fairness doctrine. Rather, only through
the narrow confines of equal opportunities for candidates and supporters, and reasonable
access for federal campaign advertisements, should FCC regulation apply. Nor shall this
Note attempt to impose such rules on the current technological and regulatory jungle that is
the Internet. Although the day may soon be upon us where the nexus between all previous
forms of media coalesce through the Internet, this Note shall focus primarily on the
pre-existing physical and regulatory framework of television communications, delivered by
cable service providers via coaxial or fiber optic cables. Furthermore, as much of this debate
centers on the content of cable system communications, a specific discussion about the
applicability to satellite television shall be reserved for another day. Nevertheless, many of
these networks discussed are carried on Direct-Broadcast Satellite (DBS) services, as well as
through cable. This Note, therefore, focuses specifically on one of the most-used media
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR MEDIA REGULATION
The First Amendment, although facially supporting the complete and
unobstructed freedom of the press, in application, allows a number of opposing
ideas. The Court has noted that the amendment compels government to support the
principle “that debate on public issues . . . be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”37
A substantial interest also exists in achieving “the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”38 Indeed, this commitment to
robust speech and wide dissemination of information is the underlying framework
for government’s regulation of the media. The result of these priorities is a host of
different standards based on the history and physical characteristics of each
communication medium, the free speech rights of the press, and the government’s
interest in controlling access to certain modes of communication.
As mentioned, the Court’s analysis for determining standards of scrutiny for
communicative media—for instance, print, broadcast, cable, or the Internet—
depends largely on the unique characteristics of each medium. Included among
these characteristics are their physical properties, such as a medium’s scarcity or
ubiquity, public accessibility, and the diversity of ideas available on the medium.
Further, the Court has “long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems.”39 These forms of expression shall now be
examined.
A. Printed Communications: A Libertarian Framework
The first and most historically grounded medium is print. As the traditionally
identified lifeblood of a vibrant and functioning democracy,40 the press has
received the greatest First Amendment protection by the Supreme Court. In its
interpretation of the First Amendment’s freedom of the press, the Court upheld the
printed press’s complete editorial discretion. The Court drew upon the diversity of
voices available in print, and the medium’s ease of access at the time of the nation’s
founding to determine the founders’ deference:
While many of the newspapers were intensely partisan and narrow in
their views, the press collectively presented a broad range of opinions
to readers. Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books
provided meaningful alternatives to the organized press for the
expression of unpopular ideas and often treated events and expressed
views not covered by conventional newspapers.41

informing the public today.
37. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
38. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978)).
39. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citation omitted).
40. See WOOD, supra note 5, at 540–43 (describing the Federalists’ increasing
recognition of the importance of drafting the Bill of Rights, including the freedom of the
press, to preserve the essential foundational elements of the republic in the 1780s).
41. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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Although the absolute editorial discretion of the printed press was challenged at the
advent of the new media era, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo
maintained the First Amendment’s deference.42 Government has felt little
compulsion to regulate the press, by virtue of the ubiquity of print, the ease with
which it is produced, and its accessibility and diversity in the marketplace.
B. Broadcast Radio and Television: The Current Zenith of FCC Media Regulation
In contrast to print, broadcast media—television and radio—are subject to the
most extensive regulation by the federal government. With broadcast emerging as a
legitimate source of news and entertainment, the federal government was forced to
generate entirely new rationales to justify regulation. The Court categorizes
broadcast speech as a less-protected form of speech.
Congress first authorized broadcast regulation with the Radio Act of 1927.43 The
Act, though not a mandate, made clear to broadcasters that by using the public
airwaves, they agreed to serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”44
The subsequent Federal Communications Act of 1934 provided a clear mandate to
the newly created FCC: ensure that “the public interest, convenience, and necessity
[be] served” by the broadcasters.45
The Court, in determining the best standard of review for broadcast, looked to
other existing media—particularly print—for guidance. The Court found broadcast
to be wholly distinct from print in determining a less-scrutinizing standard for
reviewing government regulation. In NBC v. United States, the Court found the
analogy between broadcast media and print apposite, and focused particularly on
the nature of the medium.46 As the broadcast spectrum was not free to all, but
rather, was held in the public trust, there existed a parallel duty to maintain a
broadcast media in the “public interest.”47 As all broadcast communication must fit
within the narrow confines of the federally determined electromagnetic spectrum,
which itself is finite, only so many voices may be broadcast at once. “Unlike other
modes of expression, [broadcast speech] inherently is not available to all. That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to government regulation.”48 Congress, with the Court’s blessing, could
force a sort of diversity of voices on broadcasting.
With the federal government choice to regulate the spectrum, held in trust by
broadcasters and for the public benefit, its intervention into the medium—including

42. Id. at 256 (rejecting the notion that government should be able to compel the press
to produce content-specific pieces).
43. Radio Act of 1927, Pub L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927) (repealed
1934). Current regulations pertaining to broadcasting may be found at 47 U.S.C. § 151–621
(2006).
44. Id.
45. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2006)).
46. 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
47. Id. at 227.
48. Id. at 226.
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for otherwise First Amendment-protected speech—was greatly expanded.49 In Red
Lion, the Court determined that as the spectrum was held in trust, access to
broadcast airwaves could be congressionally mandated by the FCC.50 In particular,
the Court endorsed the FCC’s requirements that broadcasters “give reply time to
answer personal attacks and political editorials.”51
The Court found further justification for the regulation of broadcast media in its
pervasiveness. As noted, “broadcast media [had] established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans.”52 This may be attributed to a number of
reasons. Of course, the physical attributes of broadcast media allow listeners to be
reached in many settings—from work, to their car, and even their home. Also
crucial is a broadcaster’s “[l]ong experience in [the field], confirmed habits of
listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program
procurement” that especially allow broadcasters to reach and influence their
audiences. 53 Finally, broadcast’s unique pervasiveness and availability to children
rendered it more freely regulable.54 The Court relied on these considerations in
determining a justification for, and the extent of, broadcast regulation.
Therefore, Congress and the FCC may impose regulations on well-established
grounds: the scarcity of the medium, justifying the licensing of stations and
requiring forced access, and the industry’s pervasiveness. Furthermore, broadcast
media regulation to this day is governed by an intermediate scrutiny test; under this
test, the courts seldom find government restrictions invalid. Simply stated in FCC
v. Pacifica, “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection.”55
C. Cable: A Nebulous Regulatory Realm
Whether cable television may be subject to such regulation, meanwhile, remains
a less contested, but nevertheless highly energized debate. While some issues
pertaining to government’s oversight of cable have already been answered, quite a
few have been resolved only partially or not at all. There are important
constitutional questions that must be considered. For instance, is cable to be
analogized to other regulated forms of media? Or will a new rationale be
formulated to justify cable regulation? The Court has yet to clearly answer such
questions. Nevertheless, the extent of and limitations in the Court’s current attitude
toward the regulation of cable television are explored.

49. See, e.g., R. Randall Rainey, The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse,
Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public
Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 308 (1993) (suggesting that when
the electronic media “corrupt[s] or degrade[s] the public good” the government must act to
protect the “trust corpus”).
50. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
51. Id. at 396.
52. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
53. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400.
54. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49.
55. Id. at 748.
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First, for purposes of regulation, the FCC and the Court identify cable television
systems and cable television networks as separate entities.56 For both of these, the
Court has held that “[c]able programmers and cable operators engage in and
transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press
provisions of the First Amendment.”57 Nevertheless, as in many First Amendment
questions, the extent of one’s free speech and press rights is unclear. The extent of
the permitted government regulation of private cable communications is equally
unclear. What has been determined, however, is that these two entities—cable
television systems and cable television networks—are treated differently in the
Court’s First Amendment analysis.58 This Note addresses the application of federal
rules to both cable networks and systems.
As a general principle, the Court has held that content on cable may be regulated
to a limited extent. Obviously, the federal government may regulate illegal
communications on cable, such as obscene material and child pornography.59
Depending on the source, the government may reprimand the cable network
operator or the cable programmer. However, the FCC’s indecency regulation over
broadcast does not extend to cable.60 In addition, various levels of government may
regulate parts of the cable enterprise. The Court has ruled explicitly that federal,
state, and local governments may control access to cable systems. For instance, in
Community Communications v. Boulder,61 and Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications,62 local governments were held to have the power to grant
exclusive franchises to build and maintain cable system infrastructures. While these
localities were not permitted to regulate per se the content of the communication
delivered by cable, they were allowed to determine which cable systems had access
to particular communities.63

56. The “cable system operator” is the organization that retransmits television feeds
from television producers, through its coaxial or fiber optic cables, to consumers. Such
system operators receive exclusive franchisees from local and state governments to operate
their infrastructure in specific regions. Franchisees are those regulated by such state and
municipal governments. “Cable television networks” are the originators of programming and
content. These two entities can sometimes overlap.
57. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (citation
omitted).
58. See, e.g., L.A. v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 493–95 (1986) (noting
that First Amendment interests are clearly implicated when dealing with cable system
operators, yet tempering such rights by recognizing municipalities’ interest in regulating its
cable infrastructure).
59. See Miller v. California for the Court’s articulation of the proposition that “obscene
material is not protected by the First Amendment,” 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973). Of course, as the
government could broadly regulate obscenity, it could do so even in light of the First
Amendment protections afforded to speech on cable.
60. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding a
component of the Communications Decency Act invalid as not the least restrictive means
available to advance the government interest).
61. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
62. 476 U.S. at 493.
63. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 628 (suggesting that “the cable medium may depend for its
very existence upon express permission from local governing authorities,” (quoting Comty.
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A part of the Court’s reasoning turns on the cable system’s reliance on public
rights of way. As the cable system operators must excavate city streets and
sidewalks and gain access to power lines, the local municipality—with power
derived from the state’s police powers64—may determine who can access such
rights of way.65 Hence, as cable systems may reach consumers only through the
assistance and blessing of each locality, regulation is more constitutionally
palatable.
The federal government, however, does not possess the police powers of the
states to grant or deny cable systems franchises.66 Accordingly, the Court found
other grounds to justify the FCC’s minimal regulation of cable systems. In Turner
I, the Court, although affirming government’s right to regulate cable, declined to
extend the Red Lion reasoning for the regulation of broadcasting to its cable
analysis.67 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted that “[t]he justification for
our distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical
limitations of the broadcast medium. . . . The scarcity of the broadcast frequencies
thus required the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the
electromagnetic spectrum.”68 Further justification came from the “inherent physical
limitation on the number of speakers” able to communicate through the broadcast
spectrum.69 The Court, therefore, concluded that such justifications could not apply
to cable television:
The [rationale in the] broadcast cases are inapposite in the present
context because cable television does not suffer from the inherent
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium. Indeed, given the
rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology, soon
there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who
may use the cable medium.70
Cable, however, could be regulated on the grounds that the government’s law
was content-neutral and passed intermediate judicial scrutiny.71 In this instance, as
a result of the cable companies’ monopoly on the distribution of television
channels, they were effectively excluding weak local broadcast networks from their
channels. The Court found that by virtue of cable’s ownership of the “essential
Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377–78 (10th Cir. 1981))).
64. See Cmty. Commc’ns Co., 455 U.S. at 55 (describing that a municipality has only
the power allocated to it by the state and previously held by the state).
65. See Preferred Commc’ns, 476 U.S. at 493–94 (acknowledging that physical capacity
could be a determining factor in permitting new, competing cable systems).
66. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 640–42 (ascribing the federal government’s only ability in
regulating cable speech, other than obscenity, to antitrust limitations, which invokes rational
basis, and to must-carry rules).
67. Id. at 636. The government’s regulation of cable was narrowly affirmed by
validating “must-carry” provisions. These provisions mandated cable system operators to
carry all local broadcast channels. This reflects that cable television systems are not
completely exempt from government oversight.
68. Id. at 637–38 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 638.
70. Id. at 638–39.
71. See infra note 76.
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pathway for cable speech,” cable system operators could “silence the voice of
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”72 Importantly, the Court found
equally crucial the duty to “ensure that private interests not restrict . . . the free flow
of information and ideas.”73 This ability to warp or deny speech over cable—
abundantly utilized prior to the Court’s ruling—was a compelling justification for
legislative intervention.74 Furthermore, because it required cable system operators
to carry local broadcasters, the Court refused to find that broadcasters’ free speech
rights were violated.75 This regulation specifically added to the diversity of voices
on their networks.
However, Turner I, while declaring that Congress may regulate access to cable
television, is perhaps best a reflection of the Court’s limitations on government
cable speech regulation: restrictions must pass the United States v. O’Brien
intermediate scrutiny test.76 In light of the Court’s rulings on these three cases, the
only legislation that may hope to survive must either relate to a local municipality
or the state’s ability to issue local cable franchises or satisfy the O’Brien test. The
government has not extensively legislated or regulated cable; the ability to do so,
however, even considering these cases, is argued by many to still exist.77
II. REGULATING POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON BROADCAST:
POLITICAL ADVERTISING RULES
The increasing reliance on new communications technologies in the twentieth
century raised concerns about the quality and fairness of the information presented
through those communications. While much of this concern centered on the
morality or decency of the message expressed,78 contemporary commentators found

72. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 657.
74. See id. at 632–33 (“Congress found that the physical characteristics of cable
transmission, compounded by the increasing concentration of economic power in the cable
industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete
for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues.”).
75. Id. at 645.
76. Id. at 652 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). The O’Brien
test held that when combining speech and nonspeech elements, a sufficiently important
government interest in regulating nonspeech may justify incidental First Amendment
limitations. Such enacted regulation must (1) be within the government’s constitutional
power, (2) further an important or substantial governmental interest, (3) which, itself, must
be unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (4) the prohibition must infringe on no more
speech than is essential to further that interest. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
77. Over the past few decades, calls for the regulation of cable have not subsided.
Professor Jerome Barron detailed extensively how the Court has grappled with various calls
for cable regulation. Jerome A. Barron, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of
Cable: Some Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495, 1497–99 (1989).
78. See, for example, Denise M. Trauth & John L. Huffman, Obscenity and Cable
Television: A Regulatory Approach, 95 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 13–25 (1986), for a
thorough overview of the development of indecency and obscenity laws, and the Court’s
treatment of them, throughout this nation’s history.
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equally serious, if not more serious, the quality of political speech.79 As described,
the issue of access to modes of communication—especially when such modes act
as purveyors of political information for the public—plainly implicates scrupulous
First Amendment analysis.80 Thus, the Court declared: “Political speech, we have
often noted, is at the core of the First Amendment.”81 Furthermore, as recognized
by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, “[t]he electorate’s increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these
expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.”82 Beginning in the 1920s, therefore, Congress and later the FCC
implemented progressive communications regulations in order to foster a healthy
political debate.83 These regulations included, among others, the now-obsolete
fairness doctrine, along with the equal opportunities provisions, reasonable access
provisions, and the Zapple doctrine.84
The history, purpose, and extent of each of these regulations on current
broadcast media shall now be explored. With one exception—the fairness
doctrine—these regulations achieve the goal of encouraging “‘the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . essential to
the welfare of the nation.’”85
This analysis begins with the defunct fairness doctrine, whose constitutional
justification is shared with the political advertising rules. These rules—equal
opportunity, reasonable access, and the Zapple doctrine—emanate from that core
First Amendment principle, noted in Turner I: that private interests not restrict the
free flow and reception of ideas.86
A. The Apex of Broadcast Regulation: The Fairness Doctrine
Although not the first of the broadcast regulations, the fairness doctrine was the
most expansive. Consistent with the government’s obligation to regulate and
maintain the broadcast spectrum in public trust, the FCC found essential the need to
ensure balanced discussion of controversial issues over broadcast media, and the

79. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967) (expressing fear that those seeking to convey important
information may be barred from doing so due to the nature of modern mass media).
80. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969) (ruling that if
congressional action chilled rather than furthered broadcast speech, the Court would
reconsider such a law); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636 (insisting that the transmission of speech
over cable validates First Amendment analysis).
81. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
82. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1975) (emphasis added).
83. See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (repealed
1934) (creating the forerunner to the FCC and establishing an early version of the equal
opportunities provision).
84. See infra Part II.A–D.
85. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663–64 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406
U.S. 649, 668, n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
86. Id. at 641.
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agency imposed strong content-based regulations.87 In the wake of Red Lion, the
FCC clarified its expectations of broadcasters under the fairness doctrine, and
touched briefly on its history:
The fairness doctrine was evolved as a policy under the public interest
standard [under NBC v. United States and Red Lion], given its
definitive policy statement in the Commission’s 1949 Editorializing
Report . . . . The Commission early determined that if the fairness
doctrine were to achieve its most salutary purpose, an affirmative
obligation in this respect must be imposed upon the licensee.88
Premised on the scarcity of the broadcast medium, the FCC implemented stringent
regulations on the broadcast networks and their affiliates.89 The justification for
these regulations, it found, originated in the First Amendment: namely, that “[t]he
keystone of the fairness doctrine and of the public interest is the right of the public
to be informed—to have presented to it the ‘conflicting views of issues of public
importance.’”90
The Court in Red Lion upheld this interpretation of the First Amendment.91
Indeed, as the doctrine’s effects were to impose limitations on the free speech rights

87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
88. In re Obligations of Broad. Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d 27,
27 (1970) (citation omitted). It is worth noting that Congress never codified the fairness
doctrine itself. Telecommunications Res. & Action Ctr. [TRAC] v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 516–
17 (D.C. Cir. 1986). When the FCC later considered rescinding elements of the fairness
doctrine, it was not statutorily mandated to continue enforcing it.
89. A licensee had the duty to ensure the fair presentation of controversial issues to its
viewing community. The fairness doctrine first imposed a two-prong obligation on
broadcasters: license holders were “required [1] to provide coverage of vitally important
controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees and [2] to provide a
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues.” In re
Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the
Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations on Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145, 146 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. Subsequent to these regulations were a number of
clarifying, corollary rules. Only the most central need be described here. The first was the
“personal attack doctrine,” which required that when a broadcaster airs an attack on the
honesty, character, or integrity of an individual, that broadcaster must “notify that person or
group of the attack . . . provide a script or tape of the attack and . . . offer reasonable
opportunity to respond using their broadcasting facilities.” Gayle S. Ecabert, Comment, The
Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Constitutional Reevaluation of Content-Based
Broadcasting Regulations, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1001 (1988) (footnotes omitted). The
“personal editorial” and “personal attack” rules were formally abandoned by the FCC in
2000 by judicial order. Radio-Television News Dir. Ass’n v. FCC, No. 98-1305, (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 11, 2000). When a broadcaster endorses a candidate for office, meanwhile, a corollary
related rule requires that that broadcaster inform that candidate’s opponent and, again, offer
reasonable opportunity for response. Ecabert, supra, at 1001. This might be described as a
broadcasting political editorial rule.
90. In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Pub. Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 604 (1964).
91. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (validating the First
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of broadcasters, it was deemed a content-based restriction under the First
Amendment; nevertheless, as broadcast stations communicate over the airwaves—
itself a scarce medium—First Amendment impingement was deemed permissible.92
Despite the Court’s affirmation of the doctrine in Red Lion, many continued to
contend that the doctrine chilled speech more than it promoted the judicious
presentation of controversial issues.93
Meanwhile, accompanying the fairness doctrine, but specifically incorporated
into the Communications Act of 1934, was a rule that dealt with the donation of
airtime for the purposes of advertisements for political candidates—this, of course,
is the equal opportunities provision.94 If a broadcaster donates airtime to a
candidate, that broadcaster must donate equal airtime at the same levels of
viewership for the other candidate; if the broadcaster sells airtime to a candidate,
the licensee must make similar airtime available to the other candidate at equal
price.95
In 1985, and after a changing of the guard at the FCC, a report was released
detailing the efficacy of the fairness doctrine. The 1985 Fairness Report, contrary
to a decade of FCC reports affirming the benefits of the doctrine,96 concluded that
the doctrine had the overall effect of chilling rather than fostering protected
political speech.97 The FCC, for the first time, suggested that the free market be
allowed to generate its own flourishing “marketplace of ideas.”98
The fairness doctrine was thereafter abandoned. Nevertheless, the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine, which persist not only in section 315, but also in the
other political advertising rules, remain in effect today.99 To understand these rules,
therefore, which emerged unscathed from the fairness doctrine’s dismantling, is
best done after fully recognizing each rule’s intended purpose and theoretical
justification—all premised in that public interest standard affirmed in Red Lion—
and contrasting them with the FCC’s reasoning for ending the fairness doctrine.
While the fairness doctrine may have indeed chilled speech, these specific
Amendment goal of “producing an informed public”).
92. Id. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed
on this unique medium.”).
93. Such calls, of course, culminate in the FCC’s internal document, the 1985 Fairness
Report. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 89.
94. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
95. Ecabert, supra note 89, at 1001–02. This provision of the doctrine is known as
“equal opportunities.”
96. Id. at 1009–10.
97. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 89, at 156.
98. Id. at 196–221. The FCC details in the 1985 Fairness Report the proliferation of
voices in the marketplace, which, without the assistance of the fairness doctrine, effectively
supply a diverse array of ideas.
99. Again, the Supreme Court, by affirming in Red Lion the public interest standard that
formed the backbone of the fairness doctrine, also affirmed the constitutionality of the
concurrent but separate political advertising rules. Furthermore, as the FCC abandoned the
fairness doctrine without the Supreme Court ever formally declaring unconstitutional its
framework in Red Lion, the basis for the advertising rules’ enforcement still persists. It is
from this essential notion that an extension to cable is possible. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
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broadcasting rules shall be shown to continue to do the opposite. Most importantly,
the First Amendment foundation of the doctrine affirmed by Red Lion—the policy
objective to keep the electorate informed by virtue of acting in the public interest—
still hold true.100 Critically, as the FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine narrowly on
chilling effect grounds, and the political advertising rules are at most deemed
content-neutral regulations, the right to be informed remains a valid and compelling
justification for applying these rules to other political speech.101
B. Section 315(a): Equal Opportunities
Government has long sought to ensure the fair treatment of political candidates
on the airwaves. Treatment need not be equal, but it must be “fair” in the sense that
all properly recognized candidates have the opportunity to present their campaign
platforms to voters. As Congressman Luther Alexander Johnson warned in support
of a rule guaranteeing equal airtime for candidates in the Radio Act of 1927:
American thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of
those who operate these stations. For publicity is the most powerful
weapon that can be wielded in a Republic, and when such a weapon is
placed in the hands of one, or a single selfish group . . . , then woe be to
those who dare to differ with them.102
Consistent with these principles, Congress endeavored to maintain access to and
accuracy of candidates’ positions via the airwaves. In particular, a regulatory
regime was created requiring “that stations that permit candidates to appear on their
airwaves must allow opposing candidates the same privilege.”103 This rule, later
incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 as section 315(a), now has
several specifying conditions.104 For instance, section 315(a) requires that “[i]f any
licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office.”105 However, these requirements do not apply to
news-related appearances. The statute provides that in the case of a “(1) bona fide
newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide documentary . . . or (4)
on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events . . . [the candidate] shall not be
deemed to [have] use of a broadcast station.”106 The purpose behind this rule is to
“encourage the ‘full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by legally
qualified candidates.’”107 But even more importantly, “the purpose of the section is

100. Id. at 367.
101. Id.
102. 67 Cong. Rec. 5558 (1926).
103. Anne Kramer Ricchiuto, Note, The End of Time for Equal Time?: Revealing the
Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 267 (2005).
104. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ricchiuto, supra note 103, at 227 (quoting Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959)).
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to require a broadcaster to treat equally all candidates for a particular office or
nomination once the broadcaster has made its facilities available to any one of the
candidates.”108
Section 315(a) seeks to ensure that if one candidate’s message or campaign is
portrayed on a broadcast station, the opposing sides must be shown as well in order
to provide as complete a picture as possible for potential voters.109 Of course, there
was much room for interpretation in the language of the statute. For instance, what
is a “legally qualified candidate,” or what truly constitutes “use”? These, for the
most part, have been resolved by subsequent legislation or FCC reports and
orders.110
The continuing grounds for the statute’s use lies in the Court’s opinion in Red
Lion. Again, the Court affirmed that as the government ensures in public trust the
broadcast spectrum, it has a special obligation that political discourse be fostered
for the public benefit.111 Also, as section 315(a) was a statutory provision,112 the
1985 Fairness Report explicitly suggested exempting it from removal.113
Furthermore, the specific complaints concerning the fairness doctrine centered on
requiring broadcasters to identify and air controversial issues, and to voice both
sides of a disputed issue.114 Broadcasters, as they had difficulty identifying issues

108. Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. A bevy of cases emerged following the introduction of section 315(a), illustrating
the scope and importance of the rule. For example, if a station provides airtime to a
candidate for their advertisement, it is compelled to provide airtime to that candidate’s
“legally qualified” opponents for the same public office. See, e.g., Florey v. FCC, 528 F.2d
124, 131 (7th Cir. 1975) (ruling that a Communist Party member running for United States
Senate in Illinois must be legally qualified—that is, on the ballot according to state law or a
bona fide write-in candidate—prior to engendering section 315(a)). Moreover, a station is
mandated to air advertisements of legally qualified candidates, even when such
advertisements contain objectionable or slanderous material. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. &
Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959) (holding that a station is immune
from state libel actions when the libelous statements come from a campaign advertisement
compelled by section 315(a)). Even when a legally qualified candidate takes airtime for
nonpolitical uses, section 315(a) construes such use as falling within its auspices. See, e.g,
Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 890 (considering an entertainer, who was also running for public office
as a legally qualified candidate, to have used airtime according to section 315(a) even when
no political issues were discussed).
110. The term “legally qualified candidates” has been clarified as any candidate for
public office who “(1) [h]as publicly announced his or her intention to run for nomination or
office; (2) [i]s qualified under the applicable local, State or Federal law to hold the office for
which he or she is a candidate; and (3) [h]as met the qualifications” if running for president,
set forth by the statute. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(a)(1)–(3) (2010). The largely more ambiguous
“use,” meanwhile, has been narrowed by the above definitions and other legislation. Id. In
addition, the candidate must thereafter qualify for a place on the ballot or have waged a
significant write-in campaign. See supra note 109.
111. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
112. See In re Obligations of Broad. Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d
27, 27 (1970).
113. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 89, at 148 (noting that Congress’s codifying
section 315(a) precluded the FCC’s abandonment of the rule).
114. Id. at 145. One broadcaster noted, “licensees are ‘conscious of the probability that
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critical to particular communities and separating the various sides, declined to air
controversial issues at all.115 Such issue avoidance was precisely what Congress
sought to avoid.
Section 315(a) is less ambiguous than the fairness doctrine as to the desired
goal. It demands equity when a broadcaster gives publicity—whether positive or
negative—to a candidate in a non-news story.116 As Congress made even more
explicit the requirements of the law, broadcasters’ confusion and uneasiness seen
during the fairness doctrine era is seldom seen today.117 Simply by covering one
candidate, a broadcaster must give the easily identified opposing candidate the
same opportunity for airtime.
C. Section 312(a)(7): Reasonable Access
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 guaranteed a candidate that
if his opponent received airtime on a broadcast station, he would be offered equal
airtime; however, broadcasters could bypass this requirement altogether by refusing
to make airtime available to anyone at all. Congress enacted section 312(a)(7) in
1972, known as the reasonable access provision, to close this loophole.118 Inspired
principally “to give candidates for [federal] public office greater access to the
media so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more
fully and completely inform the voters,” the provision, although forcing a
discussion of important political issues on the air, guaranteed candidates, at the
very least, the ability to buy airtime.119

coverage of a highly controversial issue will trigger an avalanche of protests’ demanding air
time for the presentation of opposing viewpoints.” Id. at 164 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 169.
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
117. This is not to say, however, that section 315(a) does not have its detractors. Anne
Kramer Ricchiuto has argued that section 315(a) has lost its efficacy in the modern
communications era. While not explicitly calling for the provision’s removal, she claims that
the enforcement of the provision is so lax as to render its purpose ineffective. Ricchiuto,
supra note 103, at 286–93; cf. Jonathan D. Janow, Note, Make Time for Equal Time: Can the
Equal Time Rule Survive a Jon Stewart Media Landscape?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1073
(2008) (arguing that section 315(a), though widely seen currently as ineffective, would
increase in efficacy if Congress were to push for section 315(a)’s increased enforcement and
its application to cable).
118. As with section 315(a), a number of cases exemplify the purpose of section
312(a)(7). For example, during the 1980 presidential election, the nation’s broadcasters
refused to sell airtime to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee—or any campaigns—
citing the difficulties it would have due to the total number of presidential contenders. CBS,
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1981). The Court required, pursuant to the FCC’s need
to regulate the airwaves in the public interest, that the networks provide airtime. Id. at 377–
78. Another example centered on Republican presidential hopeful Michael Stevens
Levinson, who, while running in the New Hampshire Republican Primary in 1992, was
denied access to a three-hour timeslot. In re Complaint of Michael Steven Levinson, 9 FCC
Rcd. 3018, 3018 (1994). In exchange, he was offered a five-minute spot in primetime; the
FCC ruled that such an offer—five minutes instead of three hours—particularly in light of
the number of primary contenders, was reasonable access. Id.
119. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks
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Indeed, it was less a concern that broadcasters withheld time from candidates,
than the nature of the debate over broadcasts—supplemented by candidate
advertisements—was insufficient to properly inform the electorate. Section
312(a)(7) was created out of “‘concern that the broadcast media were not making
enough time available to candidates’ . . . . In Congress’ view, greater candidate
access to the electronic media, and television in particular, was necessary so that
[candidates] may better explain their stand[s] on the issues, and thereby more fully
and completely inform the voters.”120
Section 312(a)(7) states that a broadcaster is required to “allow reasonable
access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcast station . . . by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office.”121
Importantly, section 312(a)(7) applies only for legally qualified candidates for
federal office.122 Moreover, broadcasters are not compelled to provide airtime to all
federal candidates—only those who have fulfilled the requirements of a legally
qualified candidate, as mentioned above for section 315(a).123
The section has been affirmed, both explicitly and implicitly, by the Court’s
case law.124 Of course, despite the later administrative abandonment of the fairness
doctrine, the Court’s opinion in Red Lion affirmed the government’s ability to
regulate speech over the broadcast medium.125 Specifically, however, the Court in
CBS v. FCC implicitly affirmed the constitutionality of the provision by upholding
the obligation of broadcasters that “reasonable amounts of time be afforded [to]
candidates for Federal office.”126 Further, Red Lion, by upholding the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, affirmed the policy determination of the
public’s implicit right to hear the candidates’ platforms. By affording time to
federal candidates to make clear their stances on the issues, viewers learn such
positions simply by exposure.
The equal access provision, more than creating a new rule by itself, might best
be seen as an extension of the equal opportunities provision. Not only must
broadcast licensees afford equal airtime to an opposing candidate if one is given, or
purchases time, but so too must the broadcaster explicitly make available time for
such political discussion for federal candidates. This is rooted in the strong
constitutional notion, most clearly reflected in First Amendment doctrine, that
information distributed to the voting public is paramount to fostering a healthy,
functioning democracy. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the rule, noting
that “[i]n a footnote . . . we referred to the then recently enacted § 312(a)(7) as . . .
omitted) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
120. Thomas Blaisdell Smith, Note, Reexamining the Reasonable Access and Equal Time
Provisions of the Federal Communications Act: Can These Provisions Stand if the Fairness
Doctrine Falls?, 74 GEO. L.J. 1491, 1499 (1986) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2006) (emphasis added).
122. Id. § 312(a)(7) (referring to a “legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office
on behalf of his candidacy.”).
123. See id. § 315(a).
124. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969); CBS, Inc., 629
F.2d at 12.
125. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.
126. 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1981).
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‘essentially codif[ying] the Commission’s prior interpretation of § 315(a) as
requiring broadcasters to make time available to political candidates.’”127
D. The Zapple Doctrine: Extending Equal Opportunity to Supporters
The final extension from the equal time provision is the so-called Zapple
doctrine. Articulated in response to a 1970 inquiry for clarification sent to the FCC
by U.S. Senate Commerce Committee counsel Nicholas Zapple, the rule articulated
a standard to be followed by broadcasters when asked by supporters or spokesmen
of a candidate to provide airtime.128 The FCC, recognizing the paramount
importance of informing the voting public, found such an obligation for
broadcasters: “First, we hold that the fairness doctrine is plainly applicable in the
circumstances [where a licensee sells time to a supporter of a candidate].”129
Broadcasters, therefore, are compelled to make available airtime for reply or
rebuttal, if an opposing supporter’s group or candidate spokesman is provided time.
Moreover, “[w]hen spokesmen or supporters of candidate A have purchased time, it
is our view that it would be inappropriate to require licensees to in effect subsidize
the campaign of an opposing candidate by providing candidate B’s spokesmen or
supporters with free time . . . .”130 The Zapple doctrine, therefore, requires that, like
section 315(a), if one candidate spokesman or supporting group is given time, an
equal opportunity must be afforded to the opposition to reply or rebut.131 However,
the broadcaster need not subsidize or lower its airtime rates to accommodate the
opposing candidate.132
While appearing to be an extension of section 315(a), the Zapple doctrine may
rather be understood as resting on the same theoretical framework as 312(a)(7) and
315(a). Former Commissioner William E. Kennard, for instance, explained in 1998
that all three rules were based on the public interest standard asserted by the
Communications Act of 1934 and affirmed in Red Lion for the fairness doctrine.133
The Zapple doctrine, therefore, is premised on well-trodden footing: to best further
the political debate, such supporters’ or spokesmen’s messages ought to be

127. Id. at 385 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113–14 n.12
(1973)).
128. See In re Request by Nicholas Zapple, Commc’ns Counsel, Comm. on Com., for
Interpretative Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id. at 708.
131. An example of this, while occurring during the fairness doctrine’s heyday, and
specifically centering on the Zapple doctrine, is an excellent parallel to the doctrine’s
application to sections 312(a)(7) and 315(a). In Democratic National Committee v. FCC, the
court found that supporters’ groups may speak when the opposition’s supporters’ groups are
given airtime. 460 F.2d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
132. In re Request by Nicholas Zapple, Commc’ns Counsel, Comm. on Com., for
Interpretative Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 708
(1970).
133. William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, Preliminary Views in Support of FCC
Authority to Require Broadcasters to Provide Free or Reduced-Rate Air Time to Political
Candidates, (Feb. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Kennard Statement], available at
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/ stwek809.html.
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included. Not only is the Zapple doctrine separate from the fairness doctrine and,
thus, has escaped repeal, but its theoretical underpinnings are validated by the
Court.134
Such validation was affirmed not only by the judiciary, but also by continued
FCC use. First, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the FCC’s Zapple doctrine practice.
Although not explicitly reaching the constitutionality of the doctrine, the court,
writing in the 1972 case Democratic National Committee v. FCC, found valid in
dicta the FCC’s continued adherence to the doctrine.135 Moreover, the Zapple
doctrine survived the sacking of the fairness doctrine in the late 1980s. In 1998,
FCC Commissioners Susan Ness and Gloria Tristani issued a joint statement
acknowledging the survival of and continued adherence to the doctrine.136 Despite
holding that the fairness doctrine is applicable when dealing with political
supporters’ groups,137 the FCC implied that it merely implicated the same
theoretical framework;138 the same principles supporting the fairness doctrine
support the Zapple doctrine. Indeed, as the underpinning of both the fairness and
Zapple doctrines is the public interest standard—fostering the political debate, but
as well, that the fairness doctrine broadly encompassed virtually all political
content on broadcast—such non-candidate political speech was thus covered by the
fairness doctrine.139 While the 1985 Fairness Report merely sought to invalidate
elements of the fairness doctrine whose effect was to chill speech, the Zapple
doctrine avoided such scrutiny.140 Crucially, the Zapple doctrine likely survived
due to the nominal economic cost imposed on broadcasters by requiring that they
offer airtime to supporting groups. Unlike the fairness doctrine, which placed
squarely on the shoulders of broadcasters the obligation to pay for coverage of all
sides of a controversial dispute, the Zapple doctrine merely requires that if one side
is given time or pays for time, the other side must be given the same opportunity.141
Without demanding that broadcasters generate their own content, the FCC through
the Zapple doctrine does not chill licensee speech; broadcasters simply must allow

134. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
135. See 460 F.2d at 898 (noting the existence of the Zapple doctrine and implicitly
affirming its continued use).
136. Joint Statement of Commissioner Susan Ness and Commissioner Gloria Tristani
Concerning the Political Editorial and Personal Attack Rules, no. 83-484, at ¶ 24 n.68 (June
22, 1998) (“Zapple was a corollary aspect of the Fairness Doctrine but is still enforced by the
Commission.”).
137. Id. at ¶ 28 (calling this idea “simply a common sense application of the statutory
scheme”).
138. Id.
139. See generally In re Obligations of Broad. Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23
F.C.C. 2d 27, 28 (1970).
140. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 89, at 226–27. The 1985 Fairness Report
even suggested that other doctrines, such as the so-called Cullman doctrine—which ran
corollary to the fairness doctrine but required that when a broadcaster sponsored a program
on an issue, it needed to provide free airtime to the opposition, see Cullman Broad. Co., 40
F.C.C. 576 (1963)—fall in line with the Zapple doctrine. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note
89, at 226.
141. See In re Request by Nicholas Zapple, Commc’ns Counsel, Comm. on Com., for
Interpretative Ruling Concerning Section 315 Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
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opposing groups the same opportunity for airtime, and only if one group initiates
the speech.
III. POLITICAL BROADCAST REGULATIONS SHOULD APPLY TO CABLE
Few today would argue with the social importance of television in modern
American society. Particularly, non-broadcast channels have become greatly
utilized; indeed, the viewing public has increasingly turned to alternative television
media, rather than traditional broadcast for programming. Nearly 128 million
American homes have access to programming available on cable channels, with
sixty-one million of those homes subscribing to at least basic cable.142
In light of the changing nature of communications technologies and changes in
viewer preferences, with many seeking news and entertainment from an
increasingly diverse array of sources, some on the Supreme Court have called for a
reconsideration of the standards of review for modern constitutional
communications doctrine. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, for instance, suggests that the modern “dichotomy in First
Amendment jurisprudence” has no rational basis, considering the evolving nature
of communications technologies.143 Although Justice Thomas argues that this
technological shift warrants that all communication be unregulated, his observation
about the efficacy of the current regulatory regime is correct.144
In this Part, the arguments behind the application of the political advertising
rules to cable channels will be examined. A determination will be made concerning
the applicability of such rules under current First Amendment doctrine. Further
policy considerations—some of which were ignored or misconstrued by the
Court—shall then be explored.
A. The Political Advertising Rules Could Apply to Cable
Under the Current Rationale
The Court relies on a scarcity rationale to justify regulation of the broadcast
spectrum in NBC v. United States.145 Indeed, by analyzing the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum, the Court developed the public interest standard that underpins
the broadcast rules.146 On the other hand, the Court analyzed economic
considerations and the survival of local broadcast stations in permitting federal
regulation of cable.147 Although the Court in Turner I ruled that the O’Brien
intermediate standard of scrutiny should apply for cable regulation cases, it

142. Availability,
NAT’L CABLE
&
TELECOMMS.
ASS’N
(June
2011),
http://www.ncta.com/StatsGroup/Availability.aspx.
143. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1821 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 1821–22. Thomas suggests that as most broadcast media are now transmitted
via cable or satellite, there is little reason to impose one form of regulation to broadcast
channels but not to those originating on cable or satellite. Id.
145. 319 U.S. 190, 226–27 (1943); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
388–89, 396–99 (1969).
146. See NBC, 319 U.S. at 214.
147. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994).
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nevertheless held that must-carry provisions apply to cable system operators.148
Thus, under current First Amendment doctrine, equivalents to equal opportunity,
reasonable access, and the Zapple doctrine logically could apply to non-broadcast
stations carried over cable and satellite. The rationales underpinning these,
however, are different. While Turner I relied on the survival of local broadcast and
economic competition to justify mandating must-carry rules, equally important
policy considerations would allow other cable regulations to pass intermediate
scrutiny, and therefore, First Amendment muster.
The first question to this analysis is whether applying the political advertising
rules to cable would constitute content-based or content-neutral regulations. Of
course, if content-based, strict scrutiny would apply; if content-neutral, the
intermediate O’Brien test would apply.149 The application of the rules to
non-broadcast channels would clearly qualify as a content-neutral regulation. No
matter one’s political perspective or affiliation, one may access these channels to
air their advertisements. Indeed, such application of the rule would be based less on
the message discussed by the candidate than on the candidate’s status as legally
qualified. Although imposing rules that require certain types of speech is inherently
an imposition on the absolute rights of broadcasters—that is, infringing on their
editorial discretion—the FCC by extending such rules to cable system operators
and networks would merely enhance the political debate by diversifying the voices.
As the rules are content-neutral, O’Brien applies.150
Applying the political advertising rules in the context of cable to the O’Brien
test still passes constitutional scrutiny.151 Truly, the importance of informing the
public, as an essential and substantial government interest, most helps the political
advertising rules avoid defeat. First, the right to regulate cable speech is—as
defined by a host of precedents152—within the constitutional power of the federal
government. Next, satisfying the “substantial interest element,” is the government’s
interest of informing voters on the platforms of political campaigns. It is an interest
perhaps unsurpassed in ensuring the health of the American democratic system,153
and is clearly furthered by applying such rules to cable. Third and fourth, while
restricting what advertisers a cable network may use may technically prohibit the
network’s exercise of free speech, the amount of speech that it prohibits pales in
comparison to the beneficial effect it engenders. By all measures, such rules would
promote all legally qualified candidate speech on cable, which, itself, is a core First
Amendment goal.154 Thus do the political advertising rules clear the O’Brien hurdle

148. Id. at 643–44.
149. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
150. Id.
151. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 622; Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476
U.S. 488 (1986); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
153. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 (“At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this
ideal.” (citations omitted)).
154. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978) (noting that
a substantial interest exists in having candidates reach voters by achieving “‘the widest
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by virtue of the immensely compelling nature of informing the public to properly
participate in democracy while infringing only on what advertisements a cable
network may choose.
A number of further policy considerations support the assertion as part of the
“substantial interest” prong of O’Brien. The Court has already ruled that the federal
government may impose certain regulations on cable speech in Turner I.155 The
justification for this regulation is, of course, the economic survival of local
broadcast stations. But equally important is ensuring that the public stays properly
abreast of current news—no doubt including the positions taken by candidates on
policy matters.156 It would be, without doubt, a logical extension of this rationale to
apply such rules to non-broadcast channels. Applying such rules is critical in light
of changing viewer habits, particularly viewers gathering news from a greater
number of sources, to ensure the noted goal of the FCC and affirmed by Red Lion
of maintaining an informed citizenry—indeed paramount to the proper functioning
of our democratic system.157 Again, as an intermediate scrutiny test applies to the
regulation of cable non-broadcast channels, the only element of the test at issue is
the government’s compelling interest; the interest of keeping the public informed
helps such a regulation pass as more than compelling. Indeed, the very health of
our democratic system relies on it.158 Simply, by permitting pervasive private
interests to dominate the political discussion—and particularly over the voices of
the candidates and their supporters themselves—the American voting bloc receives
a fragmented, and indeed, manipulated fact set upon which it bases its decisions.
By permitting candidates to speak for themselves, much misinformation is
alleviated.
Moreover, other considerations supporting the advancement of such
advertisement rules to non-broadcast channels are legion. First, in analyzing a
purported rationale behind the First Amendment and the non-regulation of the print
media, modern government policy has failed to keep up. As indicated, at the
writing of the First Amendment, voters gathered news from a variety of sources:
from newspapers, to pamphlets, sermons, and articles.159 One engaged in society
would hear varied political views—including the views of the particular
candidates—simply by osmosis. By walking through a market, one might hear
soapbox lectures, see headlines on newspapers at newsstands, or receive pamphlets

possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’”) (citation
omitted). This mirrors in many ways, Holmes’s notion of fostering the “marketplace of
ideas.” See United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
155. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 657. The Court noted this, founded in the belief that “[t]he
First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and
ideas.” Id. (citation omitted).
156. See Kennard Statement, supra note 133. As part of the public interest standard, the
FCC was tasked with ensuring that its regulations further the public interest. The political
advertisement and broadcast rules maintain this goal.
157. In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Pub. Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 604 (1964).
158. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641; see also supra note 154.
159. WOOD, supra note 5, at 6.
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advocating a variety of opinions. One engaged in this marketplace would
unavoidably hear from a range of sources, and thereby, implicitly, further inform
one’s own voting habits. No need clearly existed for government to intervene to
ensure a proliferation of the political debate—it naturally proliferated. Over the past
two centuries, the means of staying informed changed. The current state of the
media marketplace is not like the physical marketplace of yore. Indeed, the very
nature of communications media no longer reflects a central tenet of the First
Amendment: protecting speech, but also, protecting one’s right to receive
information. Viewers no longer are involuntarily exposed to the diversity of
thought of the former marketplace. A greater number of people today are relying on
fewer sources—accessed remotely and pandering to one side of the political or
ideological debate—than at any time before in formulating their views.160
To achieve the desired First Amendment goals asserted by Turner I, and to a
less-related extent in the broadcast cases,161 it would appear poor public policy to
deny application of the political advertisement rules to non-broadcast channels. If
the ultimate goal is to properly inform the populace, the continued application of
these rules to broadcast channels—which are becoming increasingly less-relied
upon—but not to the emerging social forces of non-broadcast channels, would
hardly achieve this. Rather, to best achieve an informed citizenry, candidates and
groups must be allowed to directly address their positions on issues via all
channels—broadcast and cable.162
There are two further considerations analyzed by the Court that, although
unlikely determinative of a lesser standard of scrutiny for non-broadcast channels
carried over cable, are revealing of the medium nevertheless. The first of these is
the Court’s current—and to a much greater extent the FCC’s in recent years—
implicit reliance on allowing the effects of the free market to best ensure the
diffusion and diversity of political speech.163 While the market-based approach
might be successful in certain contexts, as a mode of ensuring healthy political
debate, this is inherently flawed. As two commentators put it, the free market
approach “fundamentally disregards an important political insight: that democratic
governance requires accurate information and knowledge of public affairs, not
mere opinion, and certainly not an aggregation of uninformed preferences.”164 The
networks this Note targets are, without coaxing, incapable of eliciting the accurate
information called for by these commentators; cable networks will often afford

160. See supra notes 11–23 and accompanying text.
161. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 214 (1943).
162. Again, while this Note focuses specifically on cable systems and cable
programmers, many of these policy justifications are also persuasive when applied to other
media. Whether applying such concerns to channels distributed through DBS or the Internet,
the ultimate goal of informing the voting bloc remains substantial and the same.
163. This is perhaps best encapsulated by the 1985 Fairness Report. See 1985 Fairness
Report, supra note 89, at 147 (asserting that natural market pressures act as the best
mechanism for ensuring a healthy and diverse political debate over broadcast).
164. R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Interest,
and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of Habermas’ Theory of
Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1938 (1996).
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airtime to whatever content receives the greatest viewership; this commonly takes
the form of opinion-dominated talk shows—oft ill-informed and hyperbolic. While
these shows are not in themselves bereft of intrinsic informative value, policy-laden
stories, interviews, and advertisements are an electorate’s greater boon. As
evidenced by the media’s overreliance on non-policy related stories in their run up
to elections, stories heavy on policy do not sell.165 Indeed, candidate and
supporters’ speech—in the form of advertisements—may best remedy this. Short of
imposing strict fairness doctrine-like content requirements, how better might the
facts about a current issue—and candidates’ stances on them—be discussed than by
the candidates themselves in their advertisements? Without offering the opportunity
to both clearly identified sides of a political debate, cable news channels’ bottom
lines are not providing impetus to change; in the absence of such voluntary change,
in the interest of public political discourse, government must fill the gap.
The second flaw in the Court’s analysis concerns the “scarcity” rationale
justifying the regulation of broadcast, but explicitly rejected in Turner I for cable
systems. As the Court notes in this seminal cable regulation case, cable allows that
“no practical limitation” be placed on the possible number of speakers.166 Indeed,
the Court seems to suggest that an unlimited number of speakers could be
available. In light of the market-approach analysis, however, it is clear that only a
certain number of economically viable voices may truly reach viewers.167
Moreover, as cable system operators themselves have broad editorial discretion as
to what they shall carry (save, of course, for the must-carry local broadcast
channels), they may refuse to carry those channels—perhaps politically or
informatively important—that confer little economic benefit. As such, a
marketplace-imposed, monopolistic scarcity, much less a physical capacity, limits
the number of voices over cable. Indeed, this metaphorical scarcity has the potential
to create as strong a barrier as any physical scarcity.
One might argue that extending the political advertisement rules to
non-broadcast channels would little affect the informing of the voting populace.
Why rely on a candidate to convey his message, while the nature of much modern
political discourse might well be described as “sordid ephemera,” consisting of an
exchange of ad hominem attacks or non-issues?168 Quite simply, having an
opposing voice—especially when speaking directly to facts asserted by candidates
or political groups—is the best way to inform the public on a candidate’s views.
Allowing non-broadcast viewers to watch such channels, while hearing opposing
views only through the lens of scorn and disdain, does little in the way of
informing. Again, the greatest means to properly inform the viewing public on such
matters is to allow candidates and supporters’ groups to address the issues directly.
By emulating the effect of the traditional colonial market, where information was
learned by simple exposure, a better-informed electorate on candidates’ positions
on issues should result.

165. See Benjamin, supra note 24, at 604.
166. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994).
167. See Rainey & Rehg, supra note 164, at 1937 (arguing that the free marketplace does
not foster truthful, or even equitable, political discourse).
168. Crouch, supra note 24.
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Indeed, for all the above reasons, political advertisement rules, currently used
for broadcast channels, could and ought to apply to cable channels through the
current constitutional framework.
B. In Application
The total sum spent on political advertisements over the course of the 2010
election cycle reached nearly $1 billion.169 As such, the effect of these political
broadcast and advertising rules should be far-reaching. Although many campaigns
do, and shall continue to tailor their advertisements to localities, seen only on the
broadcast channels, there remains enough of a need, particularly for federal
candidates, their spokesmen, and supporters’ groups, to be heard on nationally
available cable channels. The instances of cable networks, above-noted, denying
advertisement access to certain groups170 deprive the public of an important part of
the democratic debate. Indeed, all three of these rules would impose an obligation
on cable news programmers, as well as cable system operators. These obligations
would apply to whomever sells advertising space—operators and programmers
included.
As to the potential for overlapping demands for airtime, an order of priorities
would likely be inherent. For instance, many candidates for the House of
Representatives would be ill-advised to advertise on cable channels to a national
audience. Senatorial candidates would be slightly less so. Given the nature of
current election financing, campaigns are usually hard-pressed to spend their funds
judiciously. When presidential and senatorial candidates both seek the same time,
however, priority ought to go to the candidate with the greatest need to reach that
channel’s given geographic audience. If these candidates seek airtime on a national
network, a presidential candidate would have a greater need than a senatorial
candidate; if the network catered merely to a specific geographic location—such as
a state—the senatorial candidate would be given priority.
Such obligations should not be difficult to determine; thus, the vagueness
criticisms fraught in the fairness doctrine should not apply. Candidates and their
supporters’ groups are easily identifiable. In addition, following all three of the
doctrines, networks and cable system operators need not give time away for free;
rather, only if an opposing candidate or group is able to afford the equal time slot
would it be provided.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of communications media is well recognized by American
jurisprudence. Although the First Amendment particularly protects certain forms of
media from government intrusion, implicit in the amendment’s doctrine is the
fundamental right to receive information. Turner I notes that “[a]t the heart of the

169. Michael Malone, TVB Conference: Political Could Top $1 Billion This Year,
BROAD. & CABLE (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/
article/340266-TVB_Conference_Political_Could_Top_1_Billion_This_Year.php.
170. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.
Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.”171 To receive
information is a necessity for the proper functioning of a democracy; currently,
cable news networks fall far short of achieving this necessity.
As such, under modern First Amendment doctrine, government is considered
capable of cable and satellite regulation, but only after passing Court-imposed
intermediate scrutiny. Requiring candidate speech on cable channels is not only a
content-neutral obligation but also the most effective form of informing the
populace on candidate positions on issues.
Furthermore, permitting supporter groups and others to do the same is perhaps
the best method of directly addressing issues raised by opposing groups. Indeed,
much of this obligation would stem from the need to correct misstatements of fact
presented in many political advertisements. Similar to permitting a defamed person
to clear one’s name, the application of section 312(a)(7), 315(a), and the Zapple
doctrine across all television media ensures that simple to gross misstatements of
fact—all too common in the modern political arena—be corrected or immediately
rebutted. Without such provisions, a partial picture may remain across many
television stations. The result, aside from encouraging the continued transmission
of untruths, is a voting bloc misguided on the issues and poorly informed on
candidates’ stances. To best achieve the lofty goal of informing the citizenry,
candidates and supporters’ groups must be afforded the opportunity to
communicate a candidate’s actual platform and address attacks launched against
them. If not, the increased reliance on non-broadcast communications media by
many in the voting public, relaying only those candidates’ and supporters’
messages in line with their own worldviews, will remain a deciding, and indeed,
debilitating factor in elections in the United States. And although the technical
constitutional justifications for regulating cable news networks may well soon be
outdated, antiquated by the merging of traditional media through the Internet, the
policy justifications made in this Note—advocating the continued health of the
American democratic system through voter education—shall remain compelling.

171. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 (citation omitted).

